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Abstract
For the last three decades, hash functions have been an essential 
element of  the cryptography used for securing computers and 
electronic communications. The SmartDongle is a flash drive 
produced by MicroWorks and is meant to secure data and assure 
authorized use of  software. In this project, we investigate the 
security of  certain cryptographic techniques used in the current 
implementation of  the SmartDongle’s authentication protocol. 
In particular, we analyze how the use of  Merkle-Damgård hash 
functions based on a simplified version of  the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) can affect the SmartDongle's 
security. Our study involves extensive computational 
experimentation and analysis that produced a range of  
conjectures about the security of  the SmartDongle.
Merkle-Damgård Schema
The Merkle-Damgård Schema is a function that can be used in 
producing a collision-resistant hash function. The message 
(M) is split into blocks of  a fixed size which are then 
computed through AES individually. The output from the 
previous computation is then used as the key in the following  
computation, until all blocks have  been computed. The final 
output is then the hashed text.
Project Summary
We investigated the security of  the SmartDongle Device produced by MicroWorks. The fundamental security 
idea is that the device computes and communicates ‘x, y’ pairs from a given equation. The security was based 
on the computational difficulty of  determining the parameter ‘A’ of  the equation y = Ax mod n given these 
‘x’ and ‘y’ values.
• We developed Java software to compute the possible ‘A’ values that would satisfy the given ‘x’ and ‘y’
values.
• This software would export large amounts of  data to Excel which would then be used to create graphs of
the ‘A’ values.
• Using these graphs, we discovered patterns that assisted in finding the correct ‘A’ values when they were
unknown
• We created a hash function based on AES and the Merkle-Damgård Schema to hash the ‘y’ values.
• We developed software that would compute the values of  the original protocol and the hashed protocol
• These values would then be exported to Excel and graphed  for the purpose of  comparison.
• The pattern previously followed by the correct ‘A’ value was disguised, though all possible ‘A’ values 
converged where ‘x’ was equal to a factor of  ‘n’.
• Rehashing ‘y’ a number of  times based on A modulo the factor of  n eliminated these collisions.
Regular Protocol AES Hashed Protocol
The pattern of  the regular protocol is easily identifiable 
and vulnerable to attack due to its predictability with just a 
small amount of  data collection. There are also several 
collision points, making it possible for imposter dongles to 
authenticate.
The pattern of  ‘A’ value is disguised by AES encryption 
of  the ‘y’ value. However, all possible ‘A’ values 
converge to the same value where x is equal to a factor of  
‘n.’ This is an algebraic vulnerability of  the function that 
exists with or without hashing any values.
Main Result
Though some encryption schemes run into a problem of  
reversing the encryption in repeated applications of  the 
encryption, AES does not appear to suffer from this, 
allowing us to eliminate collisions by rehashing ‘y’ a 
number of  times based on a modulus of  A that is equal to 
the  factor of  n (in this example, A mod 3). We successfully 
disguise A while ensuring that ‘y’ is not hashed to the 
same value at a given ‘x’ for any other possible A.
Future Work
The computation time for rehashing with the large primes that 
would typically be used as factors of  n could be large enough 
to bring the practicality of  this into question. However, other  
functions might be used to generate unique keys for rehashing 
and drastically reduce the amount of  times a y values would 
need to be rehashed to avoid collisions.
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